t1k:security
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Module | t1k-extended |
| Version | 2.14.3 |
| Effort | high |
| Tools | — |
Keywords: audit, owasp, penetration, security, stride, threat-model, vulnerabilities
How to invoke
Section titled “How to invoke”/t1k:security[path] [--scope auth|api|data] [--auto-fix] [--report]TheOneKit Security — STRIDE + OWASP Audit
Section titled “TheOneKit Security — STRIDE + OWASP Audit”Security audit combining STRIDE threat modeling with OWASP Top 10 checks. Produces actionable findings with severity levels and suggested fixes.
Pre-flight Step 0 — Fuzzy plan/path arg resolution (MANDATORY)
Section titled “Pre-flight Step 0 — Fuzzy plan/path arg resolution (MANDATORY)”If the user provides a fuzzy plan/path/phase arg (e.g. chaosforge-demo, plans/chaosforge-demo, phase-3), an empty arg, or natural-language ref like “active plan” / “current plan” / “this plan”, run the Fuzzy Plan / Path Resolution Protocol at skills/t1k-cook/references/fuzzy-plan-resolution.md BEFORE bail. Skill MUST NOT emit “no path matching” / “exact path required” until that protocol has been applied and Step 6 reached.
/t1k:security # Audit entire project/t1k:security src/auth/ # Audit specific directory/t1k:security --scope auth # Focus on auth subsystem/t1k:security --auto-fix # Audit + offer to apply fixes/t1k:security --report # Save findings to plans/reports/STRIDE Categories
Section titled “STRIDE Categories”| Category | Threat | Key Checks |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Identity forgery | Auth bypass, session hijacking, token forgery |
| Tampering | Data modification | Input validation, SQL injection, XSS, CSRF |
| Repudiation | Denying actions | Audit logging gaps, missing attribution |
| Information Disclosure | Data leakage | Error messages, debug endpoints, PII in logs |
| Denial of Service | Availability attack | Rate limiting, ReDoS, large payload |
| Elevation of Privilege | Access escalation | RBAC bypass, mass assignment, insecure defaults |
Full per-category checks and OWASP Top 10 mapping: references/stride-checks.md
Audit Process
Section titled “Audit Process”- Determine scope (full project or
--scopeflag) - For each STRIDE category: run checks from
references/stride-checks.md - Assign severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low/Info)
- Group findings by category
- Output report in standard format (see
references/stride-checks.md)
--auto-fix: After reporting, list High+Critical with code changes. Confirm per-fix before applying — never bulk-apply.--report: Save findings toplans/reports/security-audit-{date}.md--scope auth|api|data: Limit audit to subsystem
Gotchas
Section titled “Gotchas”- False positives on crypto: Library wrappers may look like raw crypto — check the wrapper implementation before flagging
- Config-based auth: Some frameworks apply auth globally via middleware config — check config files, not just route handlers
- SSRF via URL params: Any endpoint accepting a URL parameter is an SSRF candidate — always flag for review
- Logging PII: Check both explicit log statements AND error serialization (stack traces may include request bodies)
- ReDoS detection: Look for regex patterns with nested quantifiers:
(a+)+,(a|a)*,([a-z]+)*— dangerous